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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to address the various forms of discrimination against
approximately forty-three million disabled Americans1 in critical areas such as employment.2 Prior to the ADA’s enactment, individuals
who experienced discrimination on the basis of their disability often
did not have legal recourse to redress such discrimination.3
The purposes of the ADA are clear: “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities”4 and “to provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”5 A federal circuit split, however, has
significantly hindered the realization of Congress’s desire to have
clear and consistent enforcement standards under the ADA, particularly in the area of private employment.6 Under the language of the

* J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Florida State University College of Law; B.B.A., Management and Marketing, Emory University. I would like to thank my family for all of their
support, Mr. Dubose Ausley for his generous scholarship, and Professor Greg Mitchell for
his helpful comments. Special thanks to Shane Ramsey and the Law Review for all of their
editing work. All errors in this Comment are my own.
1. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly fifty-three million Americans, including people of all ages, have a disability. Almost two-thirds of these individuals have a
severe disability. JACK MCNEIL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P70-73, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 1997 (1997),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/sipp/disab97/asc97.html (last visited Sept. 10,
2004).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328,
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4).
4. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
5. Id. § 12101(b)(2) (emphasis added).
6. The ADA addresses private employers at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
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ADA, a complaining employee must prove that his employer discriminated against him “because of” his disability in order to win a
claim.7 The importance of these two simple words—“because of”—
may not be apparent at first glance, but the courts’ failure to interpret them uniformly has left a critical issue with major implications
unresolved: the standard of causation under the ADA.
Currently, some circuits take the position that Title I of the ADA
imposes liability upon an employer only if an adverse employment
action is taken “solely because of” a disability. Alternatively, other
circuits find that Title I imposes liability where there are additional
legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action, and the disability was only a motivating factor.8 While a majority of the circuits
have adopted the motivating-factor standard, a few circuits still apply the “solely” standard of liability.9 An inconsistent causation standard under the ADA is significant for both employers and employees,
especially from a policy perspective.10 For example, if a “solely” standard of causation is adopted, the disabled employee faces the nearly
insurmountable task of proving that an employer’s adverse employment action was strictly based on the employee’s disability alone.11
Along the same lines, the “solely” standard gives employers much
more discretion in their decisionmaking with regard to disabled applicants or employees. Providing employers with such freedom in
their employment decisions regarding disabled employees is counterintuitive to the main purpose of the ADA, which is to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.12
In the alternative, critics claim that if courts adopt a motivatingfactor standard, the burden an employee must overcome to win a
claim for disability discrimination is, arguably, much lower. Therefore, the employer will have to use greater caution, or will simply
have its hands tied in deciding whether to take an adverse employment action against a disabled employee.13 Likewise, these critics
7. Id. § 12112(a).
8. This standard is also known as a “mixed-motive” standard. For background information on the current status of the mixed-motive standard, see Jeffrey A. Van Detta,
“Le Roi Est Mort; Viva Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and
the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “MixedMotives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See Natalie Palmer Jones Storch, Comment, The Standard of Employer Liability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 931, 956 (1998) (arguing that a “solely” standard is correct); John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation
Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J.
2009, 2010 (1995) (concluding that a “solely” standard should be adopted).
11. See Storch, supra note 10, at 956.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068,
1074 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that a “solely” standard would do little to end discrimination, but instead would indulge it).
13. See Storch, supra note 10, at 956.
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claim that creating a plaintiff-friendly burden would promote an onslaught of frivolous lawsuits, which would, in turn, place a heavy financial burden on employers.14
Although these arguments make sense in theory, they are critically flawed for a couple of compelling reasons. First, contrary to
popular belief, “[employers] prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on
the merits at the trial court level.”15 Second, the ADA plaintiff already shoulders a heavy burden to make out the prima facie elements of disability employment discrimination as required under the
ADA, on which the courts have consistently taken a pro-employer
stance.16 Adopting a “solely” standard of liability, therefore, would
place another significant roadblock in front of a group of already disadvantaged plaintiffs.17
Other than the aforementioned policy arguments, this Comment
adopts the, supposedly, more “plaintiff-friendly”18 motivating-factor
standard of liability under Title I of the ADA. Thus, this Comment
rejects the “solely” standard for a number of other concrete reasons:
the plain language of the ADA reads “because of,” not “solely because
of”;19 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 simply established a floor,20 and

14. See id. at 956-57.
15. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Professor Colker’s data comes
from a study of all employment discrimination cases available on Westlaw from 1992, the
ADA’s effective date, to July 1998. Id. at 103. For further discussion regarding Professor
Colker’s studies, see infra Part IV. See also Most Federal Appeals Court Decisions Favor
ADA Defendants, Analysis Shows, DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL., Nov. 20, 1997, at 1, 8-9;
Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Mental & Physical Disability Law, Study Finds Employers Win
Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998).
16. In order for a plaintiff to be protected under the ADA, an individual: (1) must
have a disability; (2) must be a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) must have
been discriminated against by his employer because of the disability. See 42 U.S.C. §
12112.
17. In explaining the heavy burden on ADA plaintiffs, Professor Ruth Colker stated:
These [employer-favored] results at the trial and appellate levels are very troubling because they appear to run counter to Congress’ intent in passing the
ADA. When Congress passed the statute, it stated in the findings and purpose
section that it sought to eliminate discrimination for the 43 million Americans
with disabilities. Its recitation of the 43 million figure suggests that it did not
intend the courts to consider acts of discrimination to be rare, isolated events.
It intended the courts to use realistic burdens of proof to reflect Congress’ belief
that discrimination was widespread and needed to be swiftly redressed. Creating unduly high burdens of proof does not help redress the “serious and pervasive social problem” that Congress hoped to solve by enacting the ADA.
Colker, supra note 15, at 126 (footnotes omitted).
18. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1996).
19. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (2000).
20. See Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 220
(2002). Professor Colker states that Congress meant for section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act to act as a “floor” in determining the meaning of the ADA. Professor Colker also men-
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not a ceiling, for the level of protection given to disabled individuals
in the workplace; the legislative history of the ADA overwhelmingly
supports a motivating-factor standard;21 and finally, the ADA is modeled after, and has been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII, which explicitly invokes a motivating-factor standard of liability.22
Part II of this Comment examines the current circuit split in
greater detail. Part III presents the arguments for adopting a motivating-factor standard of liability (and rejecting the “solely” standard) across the board. Part IV examines policy justifications that
support a motivating-factor standard. Lastly, Part V provides a brief
conclusion.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The federal circuits have yet to adopt a uniform standard of causation for employment discrimination cases under the ADA.23 A majority of the circuits, though, have adopted the motivating-factor
standard of liability; these circuits comprise the First,24 Second,25
Fourth,26 Seventh,27 Eighth,28 and Eleventh.29 Alternatively, circuits
that currently utilize the minority view—the “solely” standard—are
the Third,30 Fifth,31 Sixth,32 Ninth,33 and Tenth34. The common trend

tions that the passage of the ADA had a rather unexpected consequence: it narrowed the
rights that were existent under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id.; see also infra Part
III.A.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90
(2003), the Supreme Court interpreted this section to mean that direct evidence of discrimination is not required in order to prove discrimination in mixed-motive cases under
Title VII. Therefore, there is no heightened burden on a plaintiff in a mixed-motive case.
Id. at 101-02. For further discussion comparing the similarities between the ADA and Title
VII, see infra Part III.C.
23. Some of the cases discussed in this Part involve claims brought under Title II of
the ADA, which covers the public sector. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. These cases are
relevant because courts tend to treat the causation standards for Title I and II claims similarly. Title II contains nearly identical causation language: “no qualified individual shall . .
. by reason of such disability, be . . . subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. §
12132 (emphasis added).
24. See Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996).
25. See Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds, 260 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2001).
26. See Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).
27. See Foster v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1999).
28. See Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995).
29. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996).
30. See McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995).
31. Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Center’s, Inc., 173 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 1999).
32. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
33. See Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1999); Zukle v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).
34. See White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
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among the circuits that continue to employ the “solely” standard is to
argue that, because the ADA contains much of the same language as
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which imposes a “solely because of”
standard, the ADA should require the same. Part III of this Comment, however, explains in greater detail why this view is flawed—a
position that a majority of the circuits have already accepted.
A. Circuits That Apply the “Solely” Standard
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit continues to use a “solely” standard of liability for ADA claims. In Zukle v. Regents of the University
of California,35 Sherrie Lynn Zukle, a learning-disabled medical
school student, brought claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and
Title II of the ADA after the school dismissed her for failing to meet
the school’s academic standards.36 The district court granted summary judgment for the University of California on the grounds that,
because Zukle could not meet the minimum standards of the University with reasonable accommodation, she was not a qualified individual under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.37
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the
grounds that the student’s requested accommodations were not reasonable; thus the court did not have to rule on the proper standard of
causation under the ADA.38 The Ninth Circuit, however, did state
that Ms. Zukle would need to demonstrate that “she was dismissed
solely because of her disability” under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.39 The court justified establishing the same standard of
liability under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by explaining that “[b]ecause the language of the two statutes is substantially
the same,” they should be “interpreted consistently.”40
In similar fashion, the Sixth Circuit, in Sandison v. Michigan
High School Athletic Ass’n,41 also held that Title II of the ADA re35. 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).
36. Id. at 1042-43, 1045.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1051.
39. Id. at 1045 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 1045 n.11.
41. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that in order to “recover on a claim of discrimination
under the [ADA], a plaintiff must show that: 1) he is an individual with a disability; 2) he
is ‘otherwise qualified’ to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and 3) he was discharged solely by reason of his handicap”) (emphasis
added); Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995) (asserting that the
analysis under the ADA roughly parallels that under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The
Sixth Circuit, in a later slip opinion, acknowledged that a majority of the other circuits
have adopted the motivating-factor standard. See Layman v. Alloway Stamping & Mach.
Co., No. 01-6568, slip op. at 5 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2004). The court even hinted that the causation standard under the ADA would be an “interesting question for the en banc court.”
Id.
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quires that the discrimination occurred “solely by reason of [one’s
disability].”42 In Sandison, a group of nineteen-year-old high school
students with learning disabilities challenged one of the Michigan
High School Athletic Association’s (MHSAA) regulations, which prohibited nineteen-year-olds from participating in cross-country.43 The
district court granted a preliminary injunction, and the Sixth Circuit
held that the MHSAA policy did not violate either section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.44
In deciding the students’ ADA claims on the merits, the court
stated: “a plaintiff proceeding under title II of the ADA must, similar
to a section 504 plaintiff, prove that the exclusion from participation
in the program was ‘solely by reason of [disability].’”45 Since the
MHSAA’s regulation prohibited the students from participating because of their age, and not solely because of their disability, the court
held in favor of the MHSAA.46
Neither the Tenth Circuit, in White v. York International Corp.,47
nor the Third Circuit, in McDonald v. Pennsylvania,48 required the
courts to define the proper standard of liability under the ADA, but
both claimed in dicta that the “solely” standard was proper. In White,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the employer because the disabled employee failed to
establish that he was a qualified individual with a disability for purposes of the ADA.49 The court did, however, state that because the
plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability, the court did
not need to consider whether the employer “terminated him solely
because of his disability.”50
The Third Circuit, in McDonald, was more cryptic in asserting the
standard of liability under the ADA.51 Again, the court did not need
to define a standard of liability because the court upheld the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer because the employee failed to prove that she was an “otherwise-qualified” individual with a disability.52 The opinion does not mention the word
“solely,” especially regarding a standard of liability, but it does men-

42. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1036.
43. Id. at 1028-29.
44. Id. at 1037.
45. Id. at 1036 (alteration in original). The Sixth Circuit has continued to use the
“solely” standard. In Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2003), the court
stated that an ADA plaintiff must demonstrate that she is “being subjected to discrimination under the program solely because of her disability.”
46. See Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1036.
47. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995).
48. 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995).
49. 45 F.3d at 363.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. 62 F.3d at 97.
52. Id.
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tion that the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA should impose the
same “substantive standards for determining liability.”53
The common analysis among every circuit that has either adopted
or shown support for the “solely” standard of causation is that the
ADA imposes similar, if not identical, substantive standards of liability as those under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
B. Circuits That Apply the “Motivating-Factor” Standard
While the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits continue
to employ a “solely” standard of liability under the ADA,54 the rest of
the circuits, which make up a majority, have finally recognized that:
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are not only different causes of
action but have different causation standards. These circuits have
decided to adopt a motivating-factor standard of liability under the
ADA for a variety of reasons. These reasons, along with others supporting the motivating-factor standard, are analyzed in greater detail
in Part III.
The Eleventh Circuit initiated the shift away from the “solely”
standard with its influential decision in McNely v. Ocala StarBanner Corp.,55 in which it became the first circuit to give in-depth
justifications for adopting the motivating-factor standard. Until
McNely, the rest of the circuits had taken the view that the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act required the same substantive standards. The
McNely court distinguished these two similar statutes by analyzing
the differences in statutory language, reviewing the legislative history, observing the similarities in causal language between the ADA
and Title VII, and, lastly, finding a lack of clear support for the
“solely” standard in the other circuits.56
Among the reasons the court gave for declining to follow the
“solely” standard was the plain language of the ADA, which states:
“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual.”57 The
court also found support for adopting the plain-language interpretation of the ADA’s causation language from the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.58 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court found that “because of,” as used in Title VII, did not
53. Id. at 94-95.
54. See supra Part II.A.
55. 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996). Although McNely was the first decision to give a detailed explanation supporting a motivating-factor (“but-for”) standard, the Eighth Circuit,
in Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transportation, Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995), was the first to reject the “solely” standard. Strangely enough, the Eleventh Circuit does not cite this opinion
in McNely. See McNely, 99 F.3d 1068.
56. McNely, 99 F.3d at 1073-78.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (emphasis added); McNely, 99 F.3d at 1073-75.
58. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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mean “solely because of.”59 In addition, the McNely court reasoned
that using the restrictive term “solely” from the Rehabilitation Act
cannot be reconciled with the main purpose of the ADA: “the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”60
Next, the court looked to the legislative history of the ADA and
concluded that it provided additional support for rejecting the
“solely” standard.61 The court focused on the House Committee Reports that explain why “solely” was left out of Title II’s language. The
Committee’s reason for not imposing a “solely” standard was that it
would lead to “absurd results.”62 For example, with a “solely” standard, a disabled black employee would never be able to have a successful claim under the ADA because the employer would simply
need to demonstrate that the adverse employment action was taken
“because of” the employee’s race, not his disability.63 The report does
mention that the employee could have a claim of race discrimination
under Title VII, but rejects that this was the intended result of the
“solely” language.64 Although Mr. McNely, the plaintiff, brought his
claim under Title I of the ADA, the court concluded that there was no
reason to believe that the Committee’s reasoning should be limited to
Title II claims, especially since Titles I and II contain substantially
identical language.65
Furthermore, the court found that every circuit, except for the
Seventh, had not adopted a “solely” standard because the other circuits merely supported it in dicta. The McNely court did observe,
however, that the Seventh Circuit, in Despears v. Milwaukee
County,66 was the only circuit to truly hold that a “solely” standard
was correct.67 While the McNely court did acknowledge the Seventh
Circuit’s stance on the matter, the court declined to agree with the
Seventh Circuit.68 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit declared that
the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted its holding in Despears, stating:
Such a reading of Despears puts it at odds with a host of decisions
holding that the ADA prohibits employment discrimination if a
covered disability is one motivating factor, even if not necessarily
the sole cause, of the adverse employment action. But these cases
misread Despears, which holds only that the plaintiff’s alcoholism

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 241.
McNely, 99 F.3d at 1074 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
See id. at 1074-75.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id.
Id.
63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1077.
See id.
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was a partial cause of his drunk driving incident, but that his
drunk driving incident was the sole cause of his demotion.69

After determining the “solely” standard was incorrect under the
ADA, the McNely court found that the district court’s jury instruction,70 which stated that liability could be imposed only if StarBanner had terminated McNely solely because of his disability, was
improper because it did not accurately reflect the law.71 The case was
then remanded with the instruction to use a motivating-factor standard of liability.72
A few years later, the Fourth Circuit, in Baird v. Rose,73 fully accepted the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to adopt a motivating-factorstandard of liability under the ADA. In doing so, the court rejected
its prior decision in Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System
Corp.,74 in which it imposed the “solely because of” standard of liability for claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. In addition to relying on McNely to reject the “solely” standard, the court
reasoned that since the plain language of the ADA is similar to that
of Title VII, there should be a consistent standard of causation—a
motivating-factor standard.75
Furthermore, in Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries,76 the
Second Circuit adopted the motivating-factor standard of liability.
The court noted that other circuits, including the Fourth and Eleventh, had held that a motivating-factor-standard analysis available
in a Title VII context also applied to claims brought under the ADA.77
Moreover, the court noted that Congress must have meant to cover
more extensive ground with the ADA than the Rehabilitation Act because it eliminated the word “solely” from the causation provision of
the ADA.78 The court, therefore, concluded that the ADA imposes liability upon employers where discrimination on the basis of disability is one factor, but not the only factor, behind an adverse employment action.79

69. Pernice v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 786 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Despears,
63 F.3d at 636-37).
70. The jury instruction stated, in part: “Do you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff has proved that he was terminated solely because of his alleged disability?” McNely, 99 F.3d at 1071 (emphasis added).
71. See id. at 1078.
72. Id.
73. 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).
74. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
75. Baird, 192 F.3d at 470.
76. 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000).
77. Id. at 336.
78. Id. at 337.
79. Id.
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Likewise, in Foster v. Arthur Anderson, LLP,80 the Seventh Circuit
adopted the motivating-factor standard under the ADA. Although the
court upheld summary judgment for the employer because the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination,81
the court stated that an employer violates the ADA if the disability
was “a motivating factor” although it “need not be the employer’s
only reason for termination.”82 In coming to this conclusion, the court
compared the similarities in language between the ADA and Title
VII.83 Additionally, the court distinguished the language of Title VII
from that of the Rehabilitation Act.84
The rest of the circuits, including the First and Eighth, have supported the motivating-factor standard of liability under the ADA for
similar reasons.85 In sum, a majority of the circuits have rejected the
“solely” standard of liability.
III. REASONS FOR ADOPTING A “MOTIVATING-FACTOR” STANDARD
A. Separate Statutes: The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
The primary reason a minority of circuits have refused to adopt a
motivating-factor standard of liability is the belief that the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act impose the same substantive requirements. It
is true that these two federal statutes are similar in many ways.86 In
fact, the ADA even provides that it should be interpreted consistently
with the Rehabilitation Act.87 This Comment, however, argues that
the Rehabilitation Act imposes a higher causation standard than the
ADA for two distinct reasons: (1) the ADA’s plain language relating
to causation is inconsistent with that of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and (2) the preexisting rights provided under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act were meant to serve as a “floor,” not a ceiling,
for rights provided to disabled individuals.
The Supreme Court has declared that “[w]hen . . . the terms of a
statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except ‘in
rare and exceptional circumstances.’”88 Title I of the ADA, which applies to the private sector, is unambiguous. Title I provides:
80. 168 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 1033.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1033 n.7.
85. Colker, supra note 15, at 119.
86. See Storch, supra note 10, at 953-54; Brief for Petitioner at 9, McNely v. Ocala
Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-1318).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (2000).
88. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 187 n.33 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court also stated
that “[w]e must give effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe
Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning.” Shaw v. Delta
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No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.89

Also unambiguous is the fact that this language does not include the
word “solely,” unlike section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which, in
pertinent part, states:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.90

Some scholars argue that since Congress relied heavily upon the
language of the Rehabilitation Act in drafting the ADA, the same
substantive requirements should apply.91 As previously discussed, a
minority of circuits have taken the same approach in requiring the
“solely” standard of liability under both statutes.92 In fact, the ADA
does state that complaints under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act should be addressed “in a manner that avoids duplication of
effort and prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards for the same requirements.”93 Preceding this part, however, the
same section of the ADA provides that “[t]he agencies with enforcement authority for actions which allege employment discrimination
under this subchapter and under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . .
shall develop procedures . . . that avoid[] duplication of effort.”94 It is,
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983). For a textualist perspective on the differences in
language between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, see Flynn, supra note 10, at 202338. John Flynn, in arguing for a “solely” standard, asserts that “textualism not only asserts
that legislative history cannot trump plain meaning, it eschews the use of ubiquitous and
ostensibly unreliable committee reports in any way. Instead, textualism focuses on plain
meaning of specific terms and a more general structural analysis of the statute.” Id. at
2025-26 (footnotes omitted).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, Title II, which applies to public
sector employment, provides a nearly identical provision:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
Id. § 12132(a) (emphasis added).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (emphasis added).
91. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (1991) (stating that the interpretation of the
ADA is consistently based on the Rehabilitation Act); Storch, supra note 10, at 953-56.
92. See supra Part II.A.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
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therefore, reasonable to infer that Congress’s intent was that claims
brought under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are merely supposed to receive nonduplicative procedural treatment by the EEOC.
To further support this reasoning, § 12117(b) is entitled, “Coordination.”95 Meanwhile, the preceding section under the same heading,
§ 12117(a), is entitled, “Powers, remedies, and procedures,” and
states that the powers of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act are provided to Title I claimants.96 This is significant because, as this Comment later discusses in Part III.C, Title VII imposes liability when
discrimination occurs “because of” race, religion, and the like, thus
supporting a motivating-factor standard of liability.97
The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not need to be interpreted
identically because the Rehabilitation Act merely acts as a “floor,”
and not a ceiling, for the substantive rights provided under the
ADA.98 The ADA, in 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a), states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”99 If the ADA, therefore, does
provide a more “plaintiff-friendly” standard of liability than the Rehabilitation Act because it imposes liability upon an employer if it
discriminated because of, instead of solely because of, a disability,
then this standard of liability is perfectly consistent with the language of the ADA.
The defendant in McNely argued that the ADA provides no
greater protection to victims of discrimination than they receive under the Rehabilitation Act, which requires a “solely because of” standard.100 This argument, however, is inconsistent with the language of
the ADA in 42 U.S.C. § 12202(a) because the Rehabilitation Act
merely sets a “floor,” not a ceiling, for the amount of substantive
rights afforded to victims of disability discrimination.101 The Eleventh
Circuit nevertheless entertained the defendant’s argument and still
came to the conclusion that the “solely” standard was improper.102
The court, however, in arriving at this decision, mistakenly relied
upon the introductory portion of § 12201(a), which states, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this chapter,” instead of using the floor-versus95. Id.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
97. See generally Van Detta, supra note 8.
98. See Colker, supra note 20, at 220 (stating that Congress intended section 504 to be
the “floor” in determining the meaning of the ADA). Professor Colker, however, maintains
that the result of the ADA has been the opposite of providing a floor for disability rights;
“[i]nstead, the ADA has pulled the rug out from under Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation
Act].” Id. at 228.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
100. McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1996).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
102. McNely, 99 F.3d at 1074.
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ceiling theory.103 Utilizing this language, the court held that since
Congress used broader language in the ADA than in comparable provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, the restrictive standards of the Rehabilitation Act should not be imported into the ADA.104 Nevertheless, the court correctly concluded that the Rehabilitation Act does
not set a ceiling of substantive rights for individuals subject to disability discrimination in the workplace.
B. Legislative History Favors a “Motivating-Factor” Standard
Further support for the premise that the ADA imposes a motivating-factor standard of liability is grounded in the ADA’s legislative
history. Although the legislative history does not provide a smoking
gun confirming a motivating-factor standard, it does, quite convincingly, point in the direction of adopting a motivating-factor standard.
Specifically, the legislative history explains why Congress decided to
leave the word “solely” out of Title II105 and how the ADA should be
“interpreted in a manner consistent with . . . Title VII.”106
According to the House Committee Reports, Congress left the
word “solely” out of the causation language in the liability provision
of Title II of the ADA because “[a] literal reliance on the phrase
‘solely by reason of his or her handicap’ leads to absurd results.”107 In
order to illustrate this point, one report gave the following example:
[A]ssume that an employee is black and has a disability and that
he needs a reasonable accommodation that, if provided, will enable
him to perform the job for which he is applying. He is a qualified
applicant. Nevertheless, the employer rejects the applicant because he is black and because he has a disability.
In this case, the employer did not refuse to hire the individual
solely on the basis of his disability—the employer refused to hire
him because of his disability and because he was black. Although
the applicant might have a claim of race discrimination under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, it could be argued that he would not
have a claim under section 504 because the failure to hire was not
based solely on his disability and as a result he would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.108

Congress, therefore, explicitly omitted this key term from the Rehabilitation Act and substituted it with different language in Title II of
the ADA. An argument could be made that this legislative history is

103.
104.
105.
106.
97.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 85 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 368.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 85 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 368.
Id.
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only applicable to prevent absurd results arising from discrimination
claims brought under Title II of the ADA. It is unlikely, however,
that Congress intended to prevent absurd results from Title II discrimination claims but allow them to occur in Title I claims, especially when both Titles employ nearly identical causation language.109
Nevertheless, even if this piece of legislative history could be pigeonholed as only applying to discrimination claims under Title II of
the ADA, a more recent piece of legislative history, which the
McNely110 court did not have an opportunity to utilize, appears to apply to all forms of discrimination under the ADA, not just under Title
II. In relevant part, this legislative history asserts that “[a] number
of other laws banning discrimination, including the [ADA] and the
[ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted in a manner
consistent with, Title VII.”111 Discussing how these acts, specifically
the ADA and Title VII, should be interpreted similarly, the legislative history further instructs that “mixed motive cases involving disability under the ADA should be interpreted consistent with the prohibition against all intentional discrimination in Section 5 of this
Act.”112 The language in section 5 asserts that “an unlawful employment practice is established when a complaining party demonstrates
that [any protected trait under Title VII] was a contributing factor
[and not the only reason] for an employment practice . . . .”113 These
statements from the committee report forcefully point toward adopting a motivating-factor standard of causation for discrimination
claims under the ADA, regardless of which ADA title the claim is
brought under.114
C. The ADA’s Similarities with Title VII
The final reason that a motivating-factor standard of causation
should be adopted under the ADA is the similarity of its causation
109. See McNely, 99 F.3d at 1075. The causation language under Title I of the ADA
states, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (emphasis added). Title II of the
ADA provides, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability
. . . be subjected to discrimination.” Id. § 12132 (emphasis added).
110. 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1996).
111. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 649, 696-97
(citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 16-17.
114. While the committee report is strong support for adopting a motivating-factor
standard of causation under the ADA, the argument could be made that “Congress could
have made clear any intention to apply the motivating-factor amendment to the ADA simply by inserting the word ‘disability’ in § 2000e-2(m) or adding a similar provision to the
ADA.” Flynn, supra note 10, at 2046. In fact, one could argue that, using a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, the fact that Congress did not include the word “disability” is instead dispositive that the committee language was not incorporated into the legislation itself. Id. at 2048.
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language to that in Title VII; in fact, both provide the exact same
causal language—“because of.”115 Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from discriminating “because of” any protected characteristic,
including “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”116 In the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the meaning of the “because of”
standard of liability under Title VII by providing, “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that [a protected trait] was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”117 Among these protected traits, however, the term “disability”
is missing.118 Nevertheless, courts have not found this exclusion dispositive; for example, the Second Circuit, in Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries, held that:
[N]othing in either the language or purpose of either statute suggests that Congress intended different causation standards to apply to the different forms of discrimination. Rather, the “substantially identical . . . causal language” used in Title VII and the ADA
. . . indicates that the expansion of Title VII to cover mixed-motive
cases should apply to the ADA as well. In light of the statutory
language and purpose underlying the ADA, therefore, we join
those circuits[119] that have held that, in establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that disability was the sole cause of the adverse employment
action. Rather, he must show only that disability played a motivating role in the decision.120

The Parker court relied on the virtually identical causation language
in Title VII and the ADA, and the lack of language in either statute
to clarify whether Congress desired different causation standards
under each statute.121
It is, in fact, true that in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII does
not include “disability” as a protected trait,122 and nowhere in the
ADA itself does it state that a motivating-factor standard of liability
is proper. While there is a lack of a definitive statutory language that
permits a motivating-factor standard, a more detailed examination of
the ADA’s statutory language reveals that the ADA does, rather indi115. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Cf. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326,
337 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a motivating-factor standard of liability is proper under
the ADA because of the similarity in causation language with Title VII).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added).
118. See id.
119. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir. 1996); Katz
v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d
196, 200 (5th Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995).
120. 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
121. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
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rectly, reference the Title VII section that permits a motivatingfactor standard of liability. The ADA, in 42 U.S.C. § 12117, entitled
“Enforcement,” incorporates all the “powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and
2000e-9,” which are provisions of Title VII.123 Therefore, of the Title
VII provisions that the ADA incorporates, the motivating-factor provision—§ 2000e-2(m)—is not one of them,124 but § 2000e-5—an incorporated provision—directly references § 2000e-2(m).125 Thus, the
ADA does indeed reference § 2000e-2(m) by incorporating § 2000e-5,
which, in turn, incorporates § 2000e-2(m).
A student-written comment noted that, while this argument has
“substantive appeal,” it amounts to the ADA’s “impermissible bootstrapping” of the motivating-factor provision of Title VII—42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(m)—because the motivating-factor standard is not a power,
remedy, or procedure, but rather a “substantive standard of liability.”126 Furthermore, the author proposed that even if the motivatingfactor standard of liability could be considered a “remedy,” it would
still amount to impermissible bootstrapping because § 2000e-5, when
amended in 1991, did not add to the list of previously available
remedies; instead, this provision acted to limit the remedies previously available under Title VII.127 This proposition, however, is incorrect because, as the author acknowledged, the amended § 2000e5(g) does not grant any additional remedies that were not available
under the pre-amended Title VII.128 What the 1991 amendments to
Title VII did was give the courts the ability to grant the previously
available remedies to plaintiffs if they prove that an employer would
have taken the same action without the presence of the impermissible motivating factor—in other words, a violation of the motivatingfactor amendment.129 Therefore, the remedies, per se, were neither
expanded nor limited by the amendment, but the court’s ability to
award these remedies was altered.
Given that the underlying argument is that the ADA incorporates
the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of Title VII, the question becomes whether the ADA’s definition of “remedies” under § 12117 is
referring to the actual remedies available or the court’s ability to
grant the plaintiff these remedies.130 If the answer is the former, the

123. Id. § 12117 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 2000e-5.
126. Flynn, supra note 10, at 2042.
127. Id. at 2042-46.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
129. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
130. The damages are listed under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The section reads:
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section [2002e2(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken
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ADA may not indirectly incorporate Title VII’s motivating-factor
statute—§ 2000e-2(m). But if it is the latter, there is no doubt that
the ADA incorporates Title VII’s motivating-factor standard of liability.
Although the question arguably remains unresolved as to whether
the motivating-factor standard of liability is a “remedy” under Title
VII, it is also feasible to pigeonhole it as a “power,”131 which would be
another way the ADA incorporates the motivating-factor standard
through § 12117. This section, in relevant part, states, “[t]he powers .
. . [of Title VII132] shall be the powers . . . this subchapter provides to
the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability . . . .”133 Neither the ADA nor
Title VII defines the meaning of “power.”
According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
“power” is defined as the “ability to act or produce an effect.”134 Since
42 U.S.C. § 12117 of the ADA states that this “power” is given to “any
person alleging discrimination,” the argument is that an ADA plaintiff is empowered with the same powers as a Title VII plaintiff,135 who
has the ability to produce certain remedies—the effect—by proving
that a discriminatory reason played a motivating factor in the employer decision, regardless of whether the employer would have made
the same decision anyway.136 And unlike the “remedies” argument,
which would not justify the ADA’s adoption of the motivating-factor
standard under Title VII if it refers to the court’s ability to grant the
plaintiff the same pre-amendment remedies,137 the “powers” argument is not dependent on the actions of the court. Therefore, a plaintiff that alleges disability discrimination, regardless of the court’s
propensity, has the power—or ability to produce—limited relief if he
is able to prove that a discriminatory reason played a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.
Another persuasive reason to explain why a motivating-factor
analysis is improper under both the ADA and Title VII merely bethe same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the
court—
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause
(ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only
to the pursuit of a claim under section [2002e-2(m)] and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
131. See id. § 12117(a).
132. The specific Title VII sections are codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6,
2000e-8, and 2000e-9.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
134. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1778 (1986).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
136. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
137. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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cause they have the same “because of” causation language has been
provided by the Sixth Circuit.138 The court asserted that Title VII is
subject to a motivating-factor analysis not on the basis of the “because of” language, but because Congress expressly modified the
standard in the Civil Rights Amendment of 1991.139 To demonstrate
this point, the court noted that since Congress amended Title VII by
specifically including the term “motivating factor,” it did not mean
that “because of” imposed a motivating-factor standard of liability
prior to the adoption of the amendment.140
Although the Sixth Circuit’s logic is compelling, it is critically
flawed for one main reason: Congress was merely codifying a standard that was in effect prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,141 but with an additional wrinkle. The House
Judiciary Committee, in its committee report, made this clear when
it noted that by establishing a “motivating factor”142 standard, it intended to “restore the rule applied by the majority of the circuits prior
to the Price Waterhouse decision that any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested employment decision may
be the subject of liability.”143 In fact, the committee report indicated
that the change being instituted was to ensure that the presence of a
contributing discriminatory factor can still establish a Title VII violation, even if an employer can establish that it would have made the
same adverse employment decision without considering the discriminatory factor.144 Congress, therefore, was not creating a motivating138. See Layman v. Alloway Stamping & Mach. Co., 98 Fed. Appx. 369, 375 n.3 (6th
Cir. 2004) (unpublished decision), available at 2004 WL 719262.
139. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994)).
140. Id. (stating that “[t]he modification of Title VII to adopt the ‘motivating factor’
standard suggests that the ‘because of’ language is not alone sufficient to trigger ‘mixed
motives’ review”).
141. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
142. The committee report did not call it a “motivating factor” standard; instead, the
report called it a “contributing factor” standard. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.2, at 18 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 711.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. In greater detail, the committee report stated:
This provision would not make mere discriminatory thoughts actionable.
Rather, to establish liability under the proposed Subsection 703(1), the complaining party must demonstrate that discrimination was a contributing factor
in the employment decision—i.e., that discrimination actually contributed to
the employer’s decision with respect to the complaining party.
Requiring that a Title VII violation is only established when discrimination is
shown to be a contributing factor to an employment decision further clarifies
that intent of this legislation to prohibit only an employer’s actual discriminatory actions, rather than mere discriminatory thoughts . . . .
. . . . [W]here two independent contributing factors, one discriminatory and the
other nondiscriminatory, [are] present, the remedies available to the complaining party will be limited where the employer establishes that it would have
made the same adverse employment decision even absent the discriminatory
contributing factor. Where the employer makes such a showing, the employee
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factor standard of liability; it was only reenacting it, with a new avenue for finding liability, after the Supreme Court strayed from the
previous standard in Price Waterhouse.145
IV. A “MOTIVATING-FACTOR” STANDARD: “PLAINTIFF FRIENDLY”?
The basic policy argument disfavoring the adoption of a motivating-factor standard of liability under the ADA is that it would critically impede employers from making adverse employment decisions
against disabled employees; and, logically, these adversely affected
employees would have much more favorable claims against their employers.146 On the other hand, if a “solely” standard of causation is
adopted, disabled employees would face the nearly insurmountable
task of proving that an employer’s adverse employment action was
strictly based on their disabilities alone.147 These arguments make
sense on their face, but the effect of adopting a motivating-factor
standard of liability may not have the drastic effect that employers
fear.
In fact, according to a recent set of studies conducted by Professor
Ruth Colker,148 the only type of cases in a comparable area of law
that fare worse than disability discrimination cases are prisoner
rights cases.149 The studies gave shocking statistics about the success
rate of ADA plaintiffs who must prove that it is not a “lifelong buffet
of perks, special breaks, and procedural protections” for people with
borderline disabilities.150 For example, the first set of studies indicated that “defendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of
reported ADA employment discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level.”151 Because these numbers caused great
controversy, Professor Colker came out with a later study, which
considered factors such as the type of discrimination claims that
were brought and the categories of disabilities.152 Even after looking

would be precluded from receiving court-ordered hiring, reinstatement, promotion, or back pay. However, the presence of a contributing discriminatory factor
would still establish a Title VII violation, and a court could order other appropriate relief, including injunctive or declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages where appropriate, and attorney’s fees.
Id. at 18-19.
145. See 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
146. See Storch, supra note 10, at 956.
147. Id.
148. Professor Colker is the Heck-Faust Memorial Chair in Constitutional Law at The
Ohio State University College of Law.
149. See Colker, supra note 15, at 100.
150. Id. at 99 (quoting Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 25,
1997, at 116).
151. Id. at 100 (footnotes omitted).
152. See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001).

276

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:257

at the prior results through a “sharper lens,”153 the study indicated
that nearly “87% of the [ADA] cases appealed and made available on
Westlaw had resulted in dismissals or grants of summary judgment
for [employers] at the trial court level.”154
The study also indicated that one of the reasons for the significantly pro-defendant numbers was a result of the courts abusing the
summary judgment standard by creating a higher threshold of proof
for ADA plaintiffs.155 In a Title VII claim, all a plaintiff needs to do is
come up with enough evidence—regardless of whether it is direct or
circumstantial—for a court to find that his protected trait, typically
an immutable characteristic such as race, played a motivating factor
in the adverse employment action.156 However, an ADA claim requires the plaintiff to prove numerous gateway matters before the
causation issue is ever considered, such as: that he is disabled under
the ADA;157 that he is a qualified individual with a disability;158 and
that the employer can reasonably accommodate the employee without incurring undue hardship.159 If these noncausation issues raise
genuine issues of material fact, the jury, rather than the judge,
should be deciding them.160 The study indicated, however, that judges
are “routinely deciding fact-intensive [ADA] cases without sending
them to the jury.”161
Another interesting aspect of this study was that included among
the circuits guilty of deciding fact-intensive issues in ADA claims
were the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh—all
of which have adopted the motivating-factor standard.162 Thus, even
among the circuits that have adopted a motivating-factor standard, it
is unlikely to aid the high number of ADA plaintiffs that are unable
to get past the gateway matters. However, the fact that it may not
cause a significant impact in the success rate of ADA claims should
not discount the importance of the causation issue because, quite
frankly, an employee that has proven that he is disabled, qualified,
and that his employer has failed to reasonably accommodate him
without incurring an undue hardship, should be entitled to some
form of remedy. But under a “solely” standard, a plaintiff would not
be able to recover a dime if the employer did not make the adverse
employment decision solely because of the plaintiff’s disability. If an

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 240.
Id. at 246.
See Colker, supra note 15, at 102.
See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
See id. § 12111(8).
See id. §§ 12111(9)-(10).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 52.
Colker, supra note 15, at 115-16.
See id. at 119. For further discussion about the circuit split, see supra Part II.
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employer can therefore come forward with any other reason for its
actions, it is completely absolved from any liability. This is a harsh
standard for ADA plaintiffs, especially for those who have claims
that merit an analysis of the causation issue.
Finally, a “solely” standard of liability cannot be reconciled with
the underlying purpose of the ADA—to “eliminat[e] . . . discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”163 Under this standard, an
employer is absolved of all liability if it can show that it took an adverse employment action against a qualified disabled employee for
any reason—no matter how miniscule—other than the employee’s
disability. As the McNely court rightly opined, “[a] liability standard
that tolerates decisions that would not have been made in the absence of discrimination, but were nonetheless influenced by at least
one other factor, does little to ‘eliminate’ discrimination; instead, it
indulges it.”164 The circuits that currently apply the “solely” standard
are essentially shielding employers that have a discriminatory motive against disabled employees. If a motivating-factor standard is
adopted across the board, a discriminatory employer would not be
protected, and as Professor Colker’s studies indicate, the number of
frivolous ADA lawsuits is not likely to increase because the success
rate of ADA claims remains low.
V. CONCLUSION
The ADA requires a motivating-factor standard of causation. The
purposes of the ADA—“to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities”165 and “to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities”166—cannot be accomplished through a “solely” standard of causation. If an employer has discriminatory intent when
taking an adverse employment action against a qualified disabled
employee, it should be penalized, and the employee should be able to
recover damages. However, with a “solely” standard, an employer can
use this favorable causation standard to defend itself from legitimate
ADA claimants, who have suffered discrimination in the workplace.
There are a number of justifications for adopting a motivatingfactor standard of liability under the ADA:167 the plain language of
the ADA reads “because of,” not “solely because of”;168 the Rehabilita-

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
99 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
Id. § 12101(b)(2).
See supra Part III.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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tion Act of 1973 simply established a floor,169 and not a ceiling, for the
level of protection given to disabled individuals in the workplace; the
legislative history of the ADA overwhelmingly supports a motivatingfactor standard;170 and, furthermore, the motivating-factor standard
of liability should be adopted because the ADA is modeled after, and
has been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII, which
explicitly invokes a motivating-factor standard of liability.171
Contrary to popular belief, a motivating-factor standard is
unlikely to increase the number of frivolous ADA lawsuits because of
the qualifying hurdles that stand in the way of ADA claimants.
Therefore, employers are not going to have to face the heavy administrative and financial burdens defending these lawsuits; furthermore, employers are still going to be given leeway in their employment actions so long as they are not discriminatory. Adopting a motivating-factor standard of liability is a vital step toward ending discrimination against disabled employees in the workplace.

169. See Colker, supra note 20, at 220 (2002) (discussing how section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is meant to act as a “floor” in determining the meaning of the ADA).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt.2, at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 711.
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).

